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§ 1513--since no change in substance was intended by the draftsmen.
DOMESTIc RELATIONS. LAw

Dom. Rel. Law § 240 Children can enforce their rights under
separation agreement.
Under Section 240 of the. Domestic Relations Law, the court
must give direction for the custody, care;. education, and maintenance of the children in any proceeding brought, for separation.
2 2
the wife breached a. separation agreement,
In Fornzan v. Fornman,1
which provided for the support of the children, thus relieving the
husband of his obligation under the agreement. 'However, in a
subsequent action, the husband was &dere&t to pay the wife pursuant
to the Uniform Support of Dependents Law1 23 the amount the
agreement had originally provided for. The children then sought
a declaratory judgment embracing parts of the separation agrtement
which were purported to have been made for them as third-party
beneficiaries.
As a general rule only the mother can enforce the agreement
directly against the father. 24 However, in the instant case, the
Court of Appeals held that where the mother's violatlon of this
agreement makes her incapable of enforcing it 6n behalf of the
infants, a procedural facility must' be provided fQr the enfoiceriient
of the rights of the infants. Therefore; in such a case, children
may enforce, as third-party beneficiaries, their-rights under separation agreements.
NE.w YoRy CITY CIVL CouRT ACT
CCA § 212.

Court can grant stay of execution in proceeding to
recover possession of commercial realty.

In Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co. v. Miller, 25 the
question was raised as to whether the Civil Court could grant a
stay of execution in a proceeding to recover possession of commercial real property. Under Sections 751, 753, and 755 of the
RPAPL, courts are given explicit power to grant stays with
respect to residential property However, there is no sedfic giant
12217

N.Y2d 274, 217 N.E.2d 645, 270 N.Y.S2d 586 ('1966).-

223 N.Y. Dom. RT. LAw

§§ 30-43. The purpose of this law is to secure

support for dependents from persons legally responsible for their support.
N.Y. -.Supp. 658 (1st
124 Kendall v. Kendall, 200 App. Div. 702, ,93
Dep't, 1922).
22550 Misc. 2d 40, 269 N.Y.S2d 471.- (Civil Ct. Brop-t, Counatr .1966),
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of such power with respect to commercial property. Therefore,
unless the court is given the power to issue a stay under some other
statute it will be deemed to lack such power.
In MacLeod v. Shapiro, 26 the first department held that Section
212 of the New York City Civil Court Act'2 17 made the CPLR's
general stay provision (CPLR 2201) - applicable to the Civil
Court in a proceeding involving residential property. Thus, in
effect, the court held that both the RPAPL and the CPLR,
combined with the CCA, give the Civil Court power to grant
stays involving residential property. Noting this, the court in PepsiCola concluded that:
If C.P.L.R. Section 2201 is applicable to stays in situations involving
residential property, to which specific reference is made in the Real
Property Actions and Proceedings Law, then a fortiori . . . [it] must
logically be deemed to be applicable to summary proceedings affecting
commercial property, to which no such reference is made in the Real
29
Property Actions and Proceedings Law.U
In granting the stay, the court rejected the argument that the
absence of a grant of power with regard to commercial property
under the RPAPL evidenced a legislative intent to curtail the
power to grant stays in such proceedings.
It should be noted that CCA § 212 is not the only provision
which the court might have relied on, since Section 2102 of the
New York City Civil Court Act provides for the applicability of
the CPLR's provisions if they are not in conflict with the act.
Thus, the broad stay power of CPLR 2201 would seem to be
available to the practitioner in the Civil Court.

12620 App. Div. 2d 424, 247 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1st Dep't 1964). See 29A
McKn7Ns,'s CCA § 212, supp. commentary 16 (1965).
127 Section 212 states that "the court shall have all of the powers that

the supreme court would have in like actions and proceedings"
-~ CPLR 2201 states that: "Except where otherwise prescribed by law,
the court in which an action is pending may grant a stay of proceedings
in a proper case, upon such terms as may be just."
129 Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co. v. Miller, 50 Misc. 2d 40, 42,
269 N.Y.S.2d 471, 474 (Civil Ct. Bronx County 1966).

